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SchizotypyEmotional distress and reasoning biases are two factors known to contribute to delusions. As a step towards
elucidating mechanisms underlying delusions, the main aim of this study was to evaluate a possible “jumping
to new conclusions” reasoning bias in healthy people with delusional ideation and its association with
emotions. We surveyed 80 healthy participants, measuring levels of depression, anxiety, cognitive error and
delusional ideation. Participants completed two versions of the beads task to evaluate their reasoning style.
Results showed that people with delusional ideation reached a conclusion after less information, as expected.
Interestingly, they also tended to change their conclusions more often than people without delusional
ideation and did so with greater conviction. Depression and cognitive errors were strong predictors of
delusional ideation but not of reasoning style. We conclude that delusional ideation in non-psychotic
individuals is independently predicted by depressive symptoms and by a high conviction in new conclusions.Science Laboratory, F. B. C.
aSalle, Montréal, QC, H4H 1R3,
4099.
uille).
.
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Delusional thinking has been the focus of many investigations and
theoretical formulations in recent years (for reviews, see Garety and
Hemsley, 1994; Bentall and Kinderman, 1998; Garety and Freeman,
1999; Bentall et al., 2001; Fine et al., 2007; Freeman, 2007).
Compelling evidence suggests that people with delusional thinking
have both a distinct reasoning style and a more affective symptom-
atology than people without delusions.
The distinct reasoning style seen in delusional patients is
characterised by a tendency to ‘jump to conclusions’ (JTC). That is,
they tend to draw conclusions based on less evidence than non-
delusional participants (e.g., Huq et al., 1988; Garety et al., 1991;
Garety et al., 2005; van Dael et al., 2006; Langdon et al., 2010; for a
review see Fine et al., 2007). Even though the conclusions reached in
the typical jump to conclusions paradigm are not of delusional
content, such a mechanism of hasty decision-making can help explain
why someone could consider a false belief in the ﬁrst place (Ziegler et
al., 2008). The same bias is observed in healthy people with delusional
ideation (Colbert and Peters, 2002; McKay et al., 2006; Freeman et al.,
2008; White and Mansell, 2009). Although delusions are typically
observed as symptoms of psychiatric illnesses, similar beliefs(hereafter named delusional ideation) also manifest in the non-
clinical population (Peters et al., 1999; Verdoux and van Os, 2002).
This JTC bias is more likely to be involved in delusion formation than
delusion maintenance, since it persists once delusions have remitted
(Peters and Garety, 2006), albeit at a reduced level, and since most
patients go on to develop delusions again in the future.
In an attempt to better deﬁne the JTC bias, Garety et al. (1991)
investigated how deluded patients would react to disconﬁrmatory
evidence. They found that patients showed a tendency to jump to new
conclusions, as deluded schizophrenia patients strongly reacted to
disconﬁrmatory evidence compared to controls. In a similar paradigm,
Moritz and Woodward (2005) reported that schizophrenia patients
were more swayed by evidence that contradicts their ﬁrst conclusion.
Indeed, delusional schizophrenia patients were more likely than non-
delusional psychiatric controls and non-patients to reduce their level
of certainty when presented with disconﬁrmatory evidence. Other
studies did not ﬁnd differences between the way delusional and
control groups reacted to disconﬁrmatory evidence (Dudley et al.,
1997; Fear and Healy, 1997; Young and Bentall, 1997; Peters and
Garety, 2006). One study in healthy participant found that people
with high scores of delusional ideation were also more reactive to a
piece of disconﬁrmatory evidence than people with low scores
(Colbert and Peters, 2002). However, most of these studies explored
people's conﬁdence levels for their initial choice in face of disconﬁr-
matory evidence. They did not explore jumping to new conclusions
per se. The jury is still out onwhether delusional thinking is associated
with an inclination to ‘jump to new conclusions’. This possible bias has
never been tested, to our knowledge, in healthy participants. One aimhange their mind with conviction, Psychiatry Res.
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with delusional ideation would change their mind once presented
with evidence that contradicts their initial conclusion andwould do so
in a hastier manner than people without delusional ideation. If such a
bias were observed, this would support the idea that delusions could
arise from an ability to jump from one (accurate) belief to another
(inaccurate) with very little evidence.
More recent conceptualizations of the formation and maintenance
of delusions consider the role of emotion. Several studies have
demonstrated that lowmood and low self-esteem, as well as negative
schemas about the self and others, may be associated with the
presence of psychotic symptoms (e.g. Close and Garety, 1998).
Krabbendam et al. (2005) found that patients who were hallucinating
at baseline were more likely to have psychotic symptoms 3 years later
if they also exhibited depressed mood at baseline. Barrowclough et al.
(2003) found that schizophrenia patients with a negative self-
evaluation scored higher on the positive symptoms subscale measur-
ing hallucinations and delusions. Smith et al. (2006) examined
patients who suffered relapses in psychosis and showed that those
with worse depression, self-esteem, and negative beliefs, had
persecutory delusions of greater severity. In healthy participants,
two longitudinal studies reported that psychosis-prone individuals
had a higher rate of Major Depressive Disorder than controls
(Chapman et al., 1994; Kwapil et al., 1997) and were at a higher risk
to develop an incident depression (Verdoux et al., 1999). Low self-
esteem was also associated to delusional ideation in the general
population (Warman et al., 2010). As in patients, depression and
anxiety scores seemed to be related to psychotic experiences
(Lewandowski et al., 2006) and especially to subclinical paranoia in
non-clinical populations (Combs and Penn, 2004).
Taken together, both reasoning biases and emotions seem to play a
role in delusions. Bentall et al. (2009) observed in patients with
paranoid delusions that emotions, and especially depression and
negative thinking, were more strongly associated with delusions than
reasoning bias. Studying deluded patients, Garety et al. (2005)
reported a signiﬁcant association between JTC and delusions, and
between anxiety and delusions. However, the JTC was not associated
to anxiety or depression, suggesting an independent role of reasoning
processes and emotions in delusions. This view has been somewhat
challenged by another study where patients with persecutory
delusions display an increase of anxiety, paranoia, and of the tendency
to jump to conclusion after exposure to urban environment (Ellett et
al., 2008). However, no correlations were run in this study to evaluate
whether the increased JTC was associated with the increased paranoia
or/and the increased anxiety. However, it appears likely that the
increased JTC was observed because of the increased paranoia. In
healthy people, some found that inducing anxiety signiﬁcantly
increases the JTC bias and the levels of state paranoia in high scorers
on the CAPE, a psychotic experiences questionnaire (Lincoln et al.,
2010a, 2010b) whilst others did not ﬁnd effect of induced anxiety on
the JTC bias (Keefe and Warman, 2011). Given the lack of strong
rationale behind an association between JTC and depression or
anxiety, we hypothesise that delusions are independently related to
JTC and emotions.
Another cognitive bias has been found in psychiatric patients,
especially depressive patients. It consists of a tendency to form
negative inferences and is measured by the cognitive errors
questionnaire with items such as: You noticed recently that a lot of
your friends are taking up golf and tennis. You would like to learn, but
remember the difﬁculty you had that time you tried to ski. You think
to yourself, “I couldn't learn skiing, so I doubt if I can learn to play
tennis.” This bias is associated with depression (Deal and Williams,
1988; Haaga et al., 1991). Surprisingly, no previous studies have
assessed whether this tendency is more frequent in people with
delusions or with delusional ideation. Moreover, the relation between
this tendency and other cognitive bias such as the JTC has not beenPlease cite this article as: Rodier, M., et al., Healthy people with delu
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errors couldmediate a link between emotions such as depression, and
delusional ideation. Freeman (2007) has proposed a model where
emotions participate in delusion formation concurrently with rea-
soning biases. However, it remains unclear whether depression or
anxiety is the best predictor of delusional ideation. Anxiety has been
clearly linked to paranoia (Freeman et al., 2008; Lincoln et al., 2010a,
2010b), but depressive symptoms as well (Chapman et al., 1994;
Kwapil et al., 1997; Warman et al., 2010). Therapy to improve anxiety
differs greatly from that to improve depression. It is thus necessary to
try to elucidate which of these emotional factors would be best to
target concurrently with delusional symptoms. Based on Freeman's
model, we examined non-clinical participants, which allows for the
assessment of reasoning and emotional factors under conditions free
from the effects of long-term illness and medication on mood and
cognition. The aim of the present study was thus to test the following
hypotheses in non-clinical people: 1/delusional ideation is correlated
with a data gathering bias and a tendency to change conclusion;
2/delusional ideation is correlated with anxiety and depression levels;
3/the link between delusional ideation and reasoning bias is
independent from that between delusional ideation and emotions
and 4/cognitive errors might mediate a link between depression
levels, JTC and delusional ideation.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Eighty (45 females) non-psychiatric participants, aged between 18 and 50 years
(mean=29.4, S.D.=9.7), were recruited using advertisements in two Montreal
newspapers (one French and one English), as other studies did (Colbert and Peters,
2002; Freeman et al., 2008). Participants were screened by phone and asked if they had
already been diagnosed with any psychiatric disorder or psychological problems. The
same questions were asked about their close relatives. They were also asked if they
were taking any medication at the time of the study or in the past. Those who reported
past or current diagnosed psychiatric disorders, close relative(s) with schizophrenia or
bipolar disorder, neurological disease, psychotropic drug use, psychiatric medication
use and substance use disorders were excluded. All participants had a minimum of
college level education. The procedure to recruit the participants included a quick
questionnaire made of 16 items from the schizotypal personality questionnaire (SPQ,
Raine, 1991; French version: Dumas et al., 1999) that was used to pre-assess delusional
ideation over the phone. These 16 items constitute two subscales of the SPQ described
by Raine et al. (1994) as ‘ideas of reference’ and ‘odd beliefs and magical thinking’. In
the ﬁrst phase of the recruitment, only 35 participants who scored 5 or more out of 16
(the maximum score), were asked to participate in the study, in order to have enough
participants with high delusional ideation scores. This was based on a pilot study that
showed that recruiting without screening for delusional ideation results in obtaining a
vast majority of participants scoring very low for delusional ideation and having not
enough variance for correlation analyses. Even with our precaution, our total sample
mean score at the Peters et al. Delusion Inventory (PDI-21) was 5.4 (S.D.=3.6), which
is slightly lower than Peters et al.'s mean of 6.7 (S.D.=4.4) (2004). Forty-ﬁve no- or
low-delusional ideation participants were recruited in a second phase amongst people
with delusional ideation scores smaller than ﬁve who had been screened during the
ﬁrst phase. The pilot study had also showed that participants' answers for the
delusional ideation questions of the SPQ sometimes changed between phone screening
and on site testing. We thus chose to use two different questionnaires: the delusional
ideation subscale of the SPQ for phone screening, and the PDI-21 for data collection, the
later being more speciﬁc of delusional ideation.
Each participant gave written informed consent in accordance with the Douglas
Institute Research Ethics Board's criteria. Participants were ﬁnancially compensated for
their time.
2.2. Questionnaires
All questionnaires were presented in the participants' mother tongue or their
preferred written language if considered fully bilingual (English or French only).
Delusional ideation was assessed using the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI-
21, Peters et al., 2004) which includes 21 questions asking whether or not the
participant has a particular idea. Delusional ideation was measured using the total
number of Yes responses on the PDI-21 (range is 0 to 21). The French version was that
used previously by Verdoux et al. (1998, 1999) and van Os et al. (1999).
To estimate participants' emotional states, we administered the Beck Depression
Inventory (Beck et al., 1961, French version: Bourque and Beaudette, 1982) and the
‘State’ part of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory form Y (STAI, Spielberger et al., 1983;
French version: Bruchon-Schweitzer and Paulhan, 1993), which we will refer to hereinsional ideation change their mind with conviction, Psychiatry Res.
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level and total scores for the Beck Depression Inventory (range 0 to 63) were used as a
measure of depression level.
The Cognitive Error Questionnaire (CEQ, Lefebvre, 1981 for both language versions)
was administered to measure the tendency for common cognitive errors or distorted
beliefs. This questionnaire was added to evaluate the relationship between this
tendency and the other reasoning anomaly tested that is the jumping to conclusion
bias. Concurrently, it was of interest to explore a possible association of cognitive errors
that are acknowledgedly linked to depression (Lefebvre, 1981; Pössel, 2009) with
delusional ideation. In this questionnaire, participants are presented a series of short
vignettes followed by a dysphoric cognition. For example, item 1 is as follows: ‘Your
boss just told you that because of a general slowdown in the industry, he has to lay off
all of the people who do your job including you. You think to yourself, “I must be doing a
lousy job or else he wouldn't have laid me off.” Participants are asked to what degree
they would have thought the same thing (on a ﬁve-point scale). Scores generated were
the sum of all ﬁve-point scores (range 0 to 96).
Intelligence was estimated using the short form of the verbal subtest of the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1997; French version:
Wechsler, 2000). The WAIS-S subscale examines abstract thinking by a test of
Similarities between items. The total score of this subscale ranges from 0 to 38. The
WAIS-K subscale looks at level of Knowledge base in a variety of domains. The total
score of this subscale ranges from 0 to 28. Measures of intelligence were collected as
Lincoln et al. (2010a, 2010b) reported that the relationship between a hasty decision
making and delusions in patients was cancelled if IQ was controlled for. In addition, in
healthy people, Freeman et al. (2008) reported a trend to observe lower IQ in those who
jump to conclusions relative to those who did not and Colbert and Peters (2002)
reported a negative correlation between IQ and change to disconﬁrmatory evidence. It
was thus necessary to evaluate whether intelligence could account for some of the
variability in the beads task performance.
2.3. Beads task
We used a beads task design based on that of Garety et al. (1991) to measure
participants' tendency to ‘jump-to-conclusions’. The task was run using a Microsoft
PowerPoint slideshow. Participants were presented with two jars: jar A contains 85% of
green beads and 15% of yellow beads, whereas jar B has the opposite proportions. Beads
were drawn from one of the two jars and the participant had to guess the jar from
which the beads were drawn. All participants were provided a speciﬁc ﬁxed sequence
(Fig. 1), as described in Colbert and Peters (2002). The sequence was stopped as soon as
the participant reached a conclusion and was as certain as possible about the jar of
origin. The task was conducted ﬁrst as a practice run (with different colours) and then
again for data collection (Part 1). Participants were given basic feedback (examiner
repeated the instructions to the participants, stating that all beads come from a single
jar) during the practice sequence to optimise their understanding of the task.
Part 2 of the beads task tested participants' tendencies to maintain or change their
conclusions in the face of disconﬁrmatory evidence. Participants were presented with a
new sequence of 38 beads andwere told that all beads were coming from a single jar, as
in Part 1. However, the ﬁrst half of the sequence had a majority of green beads,
suggesting jar A, whereas the second half had a majority of yellow beads, suggesting jar
B (Fig. 1; see Garety et al., 1991; Langdon et al., 2010). At the end of the sequence,
exactly 50% of the beads drawn were yellow and 50% were green, making the choice of
jar A or B equally likely. Participants were asked to guess after each bead fromwhich jar
the beads were being drawn and how certain they were of their guess. As such,Fig. 1. Summary of the sequences used for the beads task.
Please cite this article as: Rodier, M., et al., Healthy people with delu
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participants were choosing the jar of origin for each bead presented. It is important to
note that although this beads sequence would appear extremely unlikely, all
participants carried out the task without questioning the likelihood of the sequence.
For part 1 of the beads task, we measured the number of beads presented before a
decision was made; this was termed the draws to decision (DTD) and this variable
ranged from 1 (for participants who choose a jar at the ﬁrst bead) to 21 (for participants
who choose a jar after seeing all the beads). For part 2 of the beads task, certainty
percentages were collected for each bead, as in Fear and Healy (1997). This yielded four
measures: Max1, Max2, Jar Change, and Beads to Change (BTC). The Max1 and Max2
measures were based on the hypothesis that certainty values on the beads task are
related to a person's degree of conviction in beliefs. We examined these potential
correlates of conviction during the accumulation of supporting (Max1) and
disconﬁrmatory (Max2) evidence. Max1 corresponded to the maximum certainty (%)
attained in the ﬁrst half of the sequence (a measure that was sometimes found to be
related to delusional-like ideation, e.g., Warman, 2008). Max2 corresponded to the
maximum certainty (%) attained in the second half of the sequence for participants who
switched to the alternate jar. We also examined two measures of belief reversal as a
way of testing the degree of belief rigidity. The ﬁrst was the occurrence of a change of
belief about which jar was being used (‘Jar Change’). The second was the BTC which
corresponded to the number of beads needed to change jars in the second half of the
sequence and was our variable to assess the tendency to jump to new conclusions. In
the present study, the data-gathering bias is quantiﬁed by the negative correlation
between PDI-21 scores and DTD. A tendency to jump to new conclusions is deﬁned by a
signiﬁcant negative correlation between PDI scores and BTC.
2.4. Analyses and statistics
The hypothesis that delusional ideation was correlated with distinct reasoning
styles and emotional states was tested by examining correlations between PDI-21
scores and both performance measures on the beads tasks and measures of emotional
states. Non-parametric Spearman correlations were run because Beck, DTD, BTC and
Max1 scores were not normally distributed, as tested with the Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test (Beck: D=0.208, pb0.001; DTD: D=0.223, pb0.001; BTC: D=0.183, p=0.008;
Max1: D=0.0237, pb0.001). All results are two-tailed.
Once signiﬁcant correlations were uncovered, each signiﬁcant factor was entered
in a stepwise manner into a linear regression model. Two linear regressions were run to
test which factors predicted PDI-21 scores: the ﬁrst one with all participants and the
second one with the 32 participants who switched jar in Part 2. Kolmogorov–Smirnov
tests showed that the distributions of the residuals in both regressions did not differ
signiﬁcantly from a normal distribution (1st regression: D=0.076, p=0.200; 2nd
regression: D=0.140, p=0.110), allowing the use of this model with our data. It is
worth noting that the choice to add only signiﬁcant correlating variables in the linear
regression does not exclude the possibility that other variables could explain delusional
ideation. Independent samples Mann Whitney U test was used to analyse the
differences found between the means of a measure when there was a clear need to
divide the population into two groups: for those who switched jars vs. those who did
not in the second half of the Part 2 sequence and for those with a JTC (decision reached
after one or two beads) vs. the other participants.
3. Results
3.1. Means observed in the population sample
The mean PDI-21 score was 5.4 (S.D.=3.6). The mean score for
depression was 3.5 (S.D.=4.3), for anxiety 24.3 (S.D.=13.3) and forTable 1
Spearman's correlations, indicated as rho (p).
N=80 PDI-21 SAI CEQ Beck
DTD −0.22 (0.045) 0.16 (0.16) −0.063 (0.58) −0.082 (0.47)
Max1 0.12 (0.29) −0.005 (0.96) 0.14 (0.20) −0.028 (0.81)
Max2a 0.39 (0.029) −0.19 (0.29) −0.23 (0.21) 0.063 (0.73)
BTCa −0.16 (0.36) −0.25 (0.17) −0.14 (0.45) −0.35 (0.049)
Beck 0.46 (b0.001) 0.26 (0.018) 0.36 (0.001) 1
CEQ 0.29 (0.008) 0.35 (0.002) 1
SAI 0.063 (0.58) 1
Boldface indicates pb .05.
CEQ= Cognitive Error Questionnaire; Beck= Beck Depression Score; SAI = State part of
the State/Trait Anxiety Inventory; PDI-21 = Peters et al. Delusions Inventory; DTD =
Draws to Decision; Max1=Maximum certainty (%) attained in ﬁrst half of the sequence;
Max2 =Maximum certainty (%) attained in second half of the sequence; BTC = number
of beads needed to change jar in the second half of the sequence.
The alpha level after Bonferroni corrections would have been set at 0.006.
a Max2 and BTC correlations apply only to subjects who switched jars, N=32.
sional ideation change their mind with conviction, Psychiatry Res.
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was 23.5 out of 38 (S.D.=3.9) and was 19.1 out of 28 (S.D.=4.3) for
the WAIS-knowledge.3.2. Tendency to jump to conclusions
The mean draws to decisions (DTD) was 9.2 (S.D.=7.3) and its
median was 7, which is rather high, mainly due to 10 participants
deciding only after having seen the total sequence of beads. We found
a negative correlation between the number of draws to decision
(DTD) and PDI-21 (Table 1). DTD was also correlated with WAIS-S
(r=0.33, p=0.003). To check whether intelligence accounted for the
relationship between DTD and PDI-21, we ran a 2-step linear
regression to predict PDI-21 using DTD as the ﬁrst step and WAIS-S
as the second step. DTD remained a signiﬁcant predictor of PDI-21
measures even after intelligence was controlled for (pb0.05). There
were no correlations between DTD and Beck, SAI, or CEQ. When we
looked at the maximum percentage of certainty (Max1) reached in
the ﬁrst half of the part-2 sequence (mean=87.2, S.D.=17.8), no
correlation was found between these certainty values and delusional
ideation, showing that people with delusional ideation were not more
certain of the jar they choose than people without delusional ideation.
Those who chose a jar after one or two beads (N=11) scored
signiﬁcant higher on the PDI-21 (U=158, p=0.002) and the Beck
(U=202, p=0.014), and lower on the WAIS-S (U=225, p=0.03)
than those who chose a jar after three or more beads. There were no
other signiﬁcant differences between these two groups.3.3. Tendency to jump to new conclusions and change of beliefs
Participants who changed jars in the second half of the sequence of
Part 2 tended to score higher on the PDI-21 (Mann Whitney U=966,
p=0.051). In other words, people with delusional ideation changed
their conclusion more so than people without delusional ideation.
Table 1 shows that the strongest correlation regarding the change of
belief hypothesis was between PDI-21 and the maximum percentage
of certainty reached after switching jars (Max2, mean=72.4,
S.D.=19.3). The more participants believed their delusional ideation,
the more certain they became that the alternate jar was being used in
the second half of the part-2 sequence. There were no signiﬁcant
correlations between intelligence estimates and Max2. It should be
noted that only participants who changed their mind about which jar
was used were included in these analyses (N=32). Interestingly, the
BTC (the number of beads needed to change jar in the Part 2,
mean=28.6, S.D.=5.8) was positively correlated to the DTD
(number of beads needed to reach a decision in the Part 1)
(Spearman's r=0.563, pb0.001), showing that the tendency to
jump to conclusions is associated with a tendency to jump to new
conclusions. However, BTC did not correlate with the PDI-21.Table 2
Linear regression models predicting PDI-21 scores.
Model r (p) β (p)
Including all participants, n=80
PDI-21 Beck 0.43 (b0.001) 0.43 (b0.001)
Beck, DTD 0.49 (b0.001) 0.44 (b0.001), −0.24 (0.021)
Excluding those who stayed with original jar, n=32
PDI-21 Max2 0.42 (0.017) 0.42 (0.017)
Max2, Beck 0.56 (0.004) 0.397 (0.015), 0.373 (0.022)
PDI-21= Peters et al. Delusions Inventory; Max2=Maximum certainty (%) attained in
second half of the sequence; Beck = Beck Depression Score; DTD= Draws to Decision;
r = correlation coefﬁcient between the independent variable and delusional ideation
scales; β = coefﬁcient correlation between each independent variable and delusional
ideation scales, taking into account the other variables.
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performance
Our measures of ‘emotion’ were the scores for depression,
cognitive error, and anxiety. Table 1 displays several correlations
between Beck scores and PDI-21. As expected, Beck scores were
positively correlated with the degree of cognitive error (CEQ) and
anxiety levels (SAI). Table 1 shows positive correlations between
cognitive error and delusional ideation. CEQ levels were correlated
with SAI. Most interestingly, neither depression nor anxiety correlat-
ed with DTD or certainty levels. Depression scores were negatively
correlated with BTC, indicating that amongst those who changed their
choice of jar, the higher their score of depression, the smaller the
number of beads required to change jar.
3.5. Models predicting delusional thinking
To investigate which variables were the best predictors of
delusional ideation, we ran two regression analyses (Table 2). The
dependent variables were set as PDI-21. Independent variables were
entered in a stepwise manner and included all variables that
signiﬁcantly correlated with delusional ideation, which are Beck,
CEQ, DTD and Max2 scores. Collinearity was assessed and tolerance
coefﬁcients ranged between 0.8 and 1, suggesting that the inﬂuence of
each independent variable on PDI-21 scores can be assessed with the
linear regression.
In a ﬁrst analysis, all participants (N=80) were included and thus
Max2 was excluded as it only applied to the 32 participants who
changed their mind about the jar used. PDI-21 was best predicted by
depression and DTD.
In the second analysis which included only the 32 participants
who changed jars, the two signiﬁcant predictors of PDI-21 were Max2
and depression (Table 2). Taken together, these two factors accounted
for 31.4% of the variance in delusional ideation scores. Cognitive errors
did not emerge as a factor contributing to delusional ideation in the
model.
4. Discussion
We investigated the relationship between delusional thinking,
reasoning styles, and emotional states in a non-psychiatric popula-
tion. Delusional thinkingwas associatedwith a hasty decisionmaking,
a tendency to change conclusions and, in those who changed their
conclusion, to do so with conviction. The only emotional factor that
correlated with delusional ideation was depression. We then
examined the relative contributions of these factors in predicting
delusional thinking. We found that hasty decision making and
depression symptoms both contributed independently to the likeli-
hood of having delusional ideation.
We replicated the ﬁnding of Colbert and Peters (2002) that non-
clinical participants who are more delusional gather less evidence
before drawing a conclusion than those who have few or no
delusional ideas. Participants who scored higher on the measures
quantifying delusional ideation requested fewer beads before decid-
ing which jar the beads were coming from. The mean DTD (9.2) was
higher than what has been observed in other studies (e.g., between
5.7 and 6.5 in Warman and Martin, 2006; between 2.3 and 4 in White
and Mansell, 2009). This rather cautious number of beads requested
before making a decision was partially due to the 10 participants
choosing a jar only after seeing all the beads of the sequence.
Excluding these 10 participants gives a mean DTD of 7.1, still a high
number for this task. The other reason for this elevated mean DTD
might have been the practice run that made participants more
cautious by emphasising the importance of the task. However, others
have reported mean DTDs as elevated as ours for the same task (e.g.,
8.7 for low PDI-21 scorers in Colbert and Peters, 2002; 10.2 for non-sional ideation change their mind with conviction, Psychiatry Res.
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sample (5.4) was lower than what has been reported by the creators
of the PDI-21 (6.7 in Peters et al., 2004), thus possibly reducing the
likelihood of very few DTD. In any case, after 2.2 beads drawn, the
probability for one jar is 97% and thus a decision reached at this point
would be acceptable in Bayesian terms. This means that the general
population is usually overly cautious in this task (Garety and Freeman,
1999).
In the second half of the sequence of beads where it seemed that
beads were coming from a different jar than suggested by the ﬁrst half
of the sequence, novel ﬁndings emerged. Participants who changed
their belief about which jar was being used were more likely to have
higher delusional ideation scores. People with delusional ideation
were thus more prone to change their conclusion. In addition, the
more delusional ideas they had, the more convinced they were of
their new conclusions. However, they did not display a hasty decision
making in their change of mind, suggesting that delusions may not be
associated with a tendency to jump to new conclusions, but rather
with a tendency to change conclusions. The concept of jumping to
new conclusions has been considered with reservation (Fine et al.,
2007) as it is often regarded as being at odds with an element of the
usual deﬁnition of delusions: that they are “ﬁxed false beliefs”
(Sadock and Sadock, 2003). However, if people with delusions and
people with delusional ideation jump to one conclusion, it had to be
tested whether they jump again to another conclusion as quickly. It
seems that they do not, but our results also show that they do not
‘stick’ to their ﬁrst conclusion. The ﬁxity of the belief might be
underlain by othermechanisms and likely be speciﬁc to the delusional
belief itself. Interestingly, in face of evidence contradicting their ﬁrst
conclusion, participants with high delusional ideation scores tended
to change their conclusion. This result is in opposition with the idea
that they have a ‘bias against contradictory evidence’ or BADE
(Woodward et al., 2006a, 2007). In our study, it seems that they
considered disconﬁrmatory evidence as having more weight than
people with few or no delusional ideas.
The more-delusional participants who considered an alternate
hypothesis did so with a greater sense of certainty (i.e., higher Max2).
Together with the change of conclusion, the strong correlation we
found between this measure and the PDI-21 scores is reminiscent of
the results of Woodward et al. (2006b). These authors showed that
schizophrenia patients exhibited a hindsight bias, that is, a tendency
to disregard past errors and act as though they “knew it all along” (the
‘KIA effect’). The patients in that study were inclined to place more
importance on the evidence that was currently presented whilst
disregarding previous accumulations of evidence, reminiscent of the
model of schizophrenia proposed by Hemsley (1987). This is similar
to our ﬁndings in participants with delusional ideation where they
weremore likely to disregard their ﬁrst hypothesis and become highly
conﬁdent of an alternate hypothesis. It supports the idea that
delusional thinking is related to a tendency to attach too much
importance to current/recent evidence whilst relatively ignoring past
events. Kapur (2003) proposed that delusions are associated with an
aberrant salience of events or experiences. In the beads task, people
with delusional ideation might reach a conclusion quickly and be
highly conﬁdent about their new conclusion because of the exagger-
ated salience each bead carries for them.
Our results regarding the link between emotional measures and
delusional thinking are in line with previous studies. Depression
scores correlated with PDI-21, a result that echoes ﬁndings in
psychotic patients, reviewed by Freeman and Garety (2003), as well
as ﬁndings in healthy people (Combs and Penn, 2004). In this current
cross-sectional study, ‘cause and effect’ of this association cannot be
evaluated, however, it is interesting to note that this correlation exists
in a healthy population sample, suggesting that non-clinical emo-
tional disturbances might play a role in the formation or maintenance
of delusional thoughts.Please cite this article as: Rodier, M., et al., Healthy people with delu
(2011), doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2011.06.018As expected, Beck depression scores correlated with levels of
cognitive error (CEQ). This is in accordance with the claim of Beck
et al. (1979) that depression is associated with negativistic errors in
thinking. This claim has been supported by empirical studies that
examined the association between cognitive errors and depressed
mood (e.g. Deal and Williams, 1988; Haaga et al., 1991). CEQ scores
also positively correlated with the PDI-21 scores. Cognitive errors
could be considered an intermediate measure between reasoning bias
(distorted appraisals of the likelihood of negative events) and
emotional bias (the affective component of the cognitive error).
Nevertheless, cognitive error was not predictive of delusional ideation
after accounting for the Beck depression scores (Table 2). Accordingly,
cognitive error probably does not mediate the link between
depression and delusional ideation. Contrary to our hypothesis, CEQ
did not correlate with any of the measures in the beads task,
suggesting that the reasoning bias assessed in the CEQ is different to
that assessed with the beads task. It is likely that the cognitive errors
are strongly shaped by depression rather than by a reasoning
abnormality.
The ﬁnal measure of emotion that was examinedwas state anxiety
level. As expected, SAI was highly correlated with depression scores
and with CEQ. However, we found no relation between anxiety levels
and performance on the beads task, supporting the study of So et al.
(2008) which found no impact of anxiety manipulation on the JTC.
Other investigators have found that in actively delusional patients,
both the JTC bias and anxiety contributed independently to delusions
(Garety et al., 2005; Bentall et al., 2009). This is in contrast to the
present study where depression, rather than anxiety, was a signiﬁcant
variable. It is possible that anxiety plays a larger role in active clinical
delusions than in non-clinical delusional ideation, making anxiety a
possible marker of clinical delusions. Moreover, as proposed by
Freeman (2007), anxiety might have a stronger role in delusion
maintenance where the purpose of the delusional belief could be to
lower the anxiety levels in patients. Interestingly, induced anxiety
states are associated with enhanced JTC bias and with paranoid
ideation in healthy people (Lincoln et al., 2010a, 2010b). In healthy
participants, this relationship between delusional ideas and anxiety
might be dependent of the environmental condition and be triggered
in speciﬁc situations only.
Similarly to our results, Bentall et al. (2009) reported a strong
association between paranoid delusions and measures of emotions,
where emotions seemed independent of reasoning style. In the
present study, the association between emotions and delusions
appeared stronger than that between reasoning and delusions.
Indeed, the regression analysis showed that depression was the
variable that best predicts delusional ideation and explains the most
variance. However, in both cases, these ﬁndings are in accordance
with the relative null effect that emotional valence has on JTC (for a
review, see Fine et al., 2007).
Not surprisingly, the reasoning element that was found to be most
invoked in predicting delusional thoughts was the classic number of
‘draws to decision’, that is, the data gathering bias variable. However,
when testing only people who change their conclusion, the best
predictor of total delusional ideation scores and delusional ideation
conviction was Max2, a variable reﬂecting the certainty with which
one reaches new conclusions. As this variable has never been studied
before, comparison with literature is difﬁcult. Interestingly, Max2
explained the most variance for total scores of delusional ideation,
cancelling the impact of depression in these cases.
A number of limitations have to be pointed out. First, the present
study being cross-sectional, causes and consequences are only
speculative. Second, a large number of correlations were run which
enhanced the possibility of type I errors. A Bonferroni correction
would have inversely enhanced the risk of hiding signiﬁcant ﬁndings.
Until these results are replicated in healthy people, the present
conclusions should be taken with cautious. Finally, the present resultssional ideation change their mind with conviction, Psychiatry Res.
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like ideation. Thus, despite the fact that the continuum between
psychosis and normality has been repetitively supported (Peters et al.,
1999; van Os et al., 1999; Johns and van Os, 2001; Verdoux and van Os,
2002), the extrapolations to clinical groups have to be taken with
great caution.
In conclusion, in addition to replicating the hasty decision making
phenomenon in non-clinical individuals with delusional ideation, we
showed that this population is more likely to change their conclusions
and to develop an unusually high degree of conviction about alternate,
new beliefs. Even though the jump to new conclusions style is not
supported by our results, it is the ﬁrst time that delusional ideation is
associated with a tendency to change conclusions in healthy
participants. Interestingly, this tendency should support the idea
that people with delusional ideas would jump to a ﬁrst conclusion and
then change their mind, not ‘sticking’ to one conclusion or one belief.
The maintenance of the delusional idea is thus likely to rest on other
mechanisms, possibly on emotional ones. Delusional ideation was
associated with levels of depression, but this association was not
mediated by a distinct reasoning style. Emotional and reasoning
factors emerged as independent factors predicting delusional think-
ing. With further elaborations of the distinct reasoning style of mildly
delusional individuals and delusional patients, more reﬁned ap-
proaches to cognitive behavioural therapy may be developed.
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